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Abstract 
The paper argues that the crisis, mistakenly interpreted as a standard fiscal/balance of payments problem, 
was generated by the incomplete nature of the European institutions and a disregard for the consequences 
of differences in the stages of development of the member countries. The ideological pre-conception that 
markets are self-equilibrating through price competition has been used to justify disastrous internal 
devaluation policies in the belief that an austerity regime associated with institutions close to those 
assumed to prevail in ‘core’ countries would create the ‘right’ environment for resuming growth in the 
periphery.  
An analysis of the main phases of the development of European countries since the second post-war 
period provides evidence of wide differences in the productive structures of the countries of the centre 
and the southern periphery of Europe at the start of the Europeanization process. These differences 
entailed an asymmetric capacity of countries at differing levels of development to adjust to external 
shocks. This longer-term perspective helps us better to assess the limitations of the two alternatives that 
have been suggested to steer the EZ economy out of its present quagmire: internal devaluation (wage 
flexibility) in the deficit (Southern European) countries, or expansion of internal demand in ‘core’ 
countries (Germany).  
Both measures, it is argued, do not go to the root of the development and debt sustainability problems of 
Southern European countries, which continue to lack a sufficiently broad and differentiated productive 
structure. Given the differences in the levels of development of the various EU countries and their 
varying capacities to cope with change, fiscal policy should be assigned two complementary targets: the 
role of actively promoting — through investment —the removal of development bottlenecks and the 
renewal of the productive base, and a redistributive and compensative function. This new strategy entails 
the assignment of a strategic importance to investment guidance by the State through industrial policies 
geared to diversifying, innovating and strengthening the economic structures of peripheral countries. The 
paper concludes that this change of strategy is even more important today, since the crisis marks another 
important structural break in world trade, similar to those of the 1970s and the first decade of the new 
millennium. 
JEL Classifications: F15, O24, O25 
Keywords: Eurocrisis, Southern Europe, Germany, Competitiveness, Industrial Policy. 
1. Introduction 
Three years ago, Shambaugh (2012) remarked that the Eurozone area was 
facing three interlocking crises: a banking crisis, a sovereign debt crisis, and a 
growth crisis. Banks were undercapitalized and faced liquidity problems in a number 
of countries; the rise in bond yields was associated with difficulties in funding public 
debt; and lastly, economic growth was low in the euro area as a whole and unequally 
distributed across countries. Shambaugh stressed the interconnection of these crises: 
“the problems of weak banks and high sovereign debt are mutually reinforcing, and 
both are exacerbated by weak growth but also in turn constrain growth”. His 
conclusion was that “policy responses that fail to take into account the 
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interdependent nature of the problems will likely be incomplete or even 
counterproductive”. It is not necessary to concur with all the stages of Shambaugh’s 
analysis to agree with his conclusion, which still remains valid today in a situation 
that, when compared with the state of affairs at the time he was writing, reveals – 
together with some positive changes – the persistence (if not a dramatic aggravation) 
of certain unresolved problems. The sovereign debt crisis has been averted by a 
rigorously deflationary fiscal policy that has been implemented without interruption 
since 2010. After July 2012, this was accompanied by a belated commitment on the 
part of the ECB to break the vicious circle of expectations that, in the absence of a 
debt-buyer of last resort, encouraged a massive liquidation of sovereign debt. 
Between 2010 and 2014, the Eurozone countries (EZ) implemented a huge 
contractionary policy “equal to four percentage points of the monetary union’s 
economy… The GIIPS [Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain] accounted for 
48% of the fiscal swing, even though they accounted for only a third of Eurozone 
GDP. Eurozone core nations decided that they too had to embrace fiscal rectitude. As 
the monetary union’s largest economy, tightening by Germany accounted for 32% of 
the Eurozone’s overall fiscal tightening. France’s austerity amounted to 13 % of the 
Eurozone total” (CEPR, 2015, pp.10-11). Owing to these austerity policies, only a 
few Eurozone nations have recovered their pre-crisis growth and employment rates 
(Figure 1), while socio-economic conditions in the periphery have worsened 
dramatically. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Orphanides 2015. 
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With households, corporations, and governments simultaneously reducing 
expenditure, income and production have dropped and unemployment has soared, 
with youth and long-term unemployment and inactivity rates at record levels. Several 
years of harsh austerity have also taken their toll in terms of inequality and poverty, 
and have cancelled a significant part of the gains in living standards achieved by 
low-income households over the past 20 years. Welfare provisions have been cut 
everywhere: the European Union’s ambitious targets for combating poverty and 
achieving social inclusion are self-delusive because of the constraints faced by the 
Member States on the periphery, which were hardest hit during the crisis and are no 
longer in a position to ensure even a minimum level of social inclusion (Arpe et al. 
2015). The destruction of productive capacity, skill capabilities, and welfare 
protection will take years to redress. Meanwhile, the euro area is churning out the 
world's largest current account surplus in value terms (approximately 3.0% of GDP 
in 2015) (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  
The Euro area current account balances 
 
Source: European Commission, Alert Mechanism 2016, p. 9. 
 
The bulk of this is accounted for by Germany (7.9% of GDP) and the 
Netherlands (10.6%), but also the former deficit countries are now recording 
balanced or surplus positions. The austerity measures opened up a process of 
alignment with Germany also for other economic indicators of the peripheral 
countries: since 2010, the European periphery has achieved a significant reduction in 
unit labour costs compared with Germany and EU27 (Cirillo and Guarascio, 2015 p. 
5) (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3  
 Changes in unit labour costs, 2005-14, %  
 
 Source: Cirillo and Guarascio (2015). 
 
After 2010, the government primary balances of countries across the Eurozone 
also reached a surplus, converging with Germany’s (see Saraceno, 2015). At first 
glance, the recession has ‘induced’ (or forced) the adjustment of all those indicators 
whose misalignment, according to many commentators — but also the Troika and 
Germany’s political representatives — had been at the origin of the crisis. If one adds 
that the ECB’s quantitative easing (QE) is encouraging the devaluation of the euro 
against the dollar and that oil prices are subdued, it could be argued, to rephrase 
Chairman Mao, that “everything under heaven is in order, and the situation is 
excellent”. Contrary to expectations, however, the recovery is very sluggish, and is 
exposed to the risk of being derailed: in fact, QE alone is at best ineffective, and at 
worst conducive to new bubbles. With the rest of Eurozone in enduring recession and 
the international economy losing momentum, the German export engine — which is 
offered as a model for all Eurozone countries — may also falter, dragging the other 
countries with it.  
One may wonder whether the very idea of a model to be imitated is in fact the 
origin of a systematic flaw in current analyses of the crisis: the fallacy of 
composition (the idea that what is true of the parts must also be true of the whole). 
This fallacy is particularly evident in the limitations of the export-led model: as is 
often recalled (Whyte 2010, and Krugman and Saraceno on their blogs, among 
others), it is impossible for all countries to base their growth on exports. More 
generally, as in the case of the interlocking crises cited above, if the mutual, systemic 
relations of actors are not explicitly taken into consideration, the risk of a fallacy of 
composition will always loom. This warning should also be borne in mind if the 
nationalistic bias that results from taking a country as the unit of analysis is to be 
avoided: in fact, countries include actors with different destinies: banks, businesses, 
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workers, the unemployed, rentiers, pensioners, children, etc.). The unknown factor 
(the crucial object of the dispute) in every crisis is how the present and future costs 
of the crisis will be allocated, in particular between creditors and debtors. If we 
consider only countries, we neglect the internal distribution of the economic and 
social costs of the crisis. For reason of space, however, this aspect will be dealt with 
only briefly.  
2. The limitations of a consensus narrative on “why the crisis became so 
bad and lasted so long” 
In November 2015, a conspicuous number of prestigious economists1 signed a 
document entitled Rebooting the Eurozone: Step 1 - Agreeing a crisis narrative 
(CEPR 2015). Although claiming to come from different backgrounds, the authors 
found it “surprisingly easy to agree upon a narrative and a list of the main causes of 
the EZ Crisis”. The key terms in their account are “excessive intra-EZ capital flows” 
and “sudden stop”. The crisis is interpreted as a standard balance of payments crisis 
that can be analysed using models previously applied to developing countries. A 
country’s membership of a monetary union is considered irrelevant except for the 
greater opacity in signalling the risks involved in the formation of large capital flow 
imbalances. “EZ also mattered since the incomplete institutional infrastructure [no 
lender of last resort, impossibility of devaluation] amplified the initial loss of trust in 
the deficit nations” (italics added). The main message, which assigns blame and 
transmits recipes for the future, is that “All the nations stricken by the Crisis were 
running current account deficits. None of those running current account surpluses 
were hit”.  
Together with an important admission, to which we will return below, the 
paper contains two striking omissions and a number of unconvincing or contradictory 
statements. The first significant omission is the absence of any reference to the 
complementary relationship between the formation of a persistent, growing current 
account surplus by the core countries (in particular Germany) after 1999, and the 
corresponding deficit of the peripheral European countries with respect to Germany. 
Trade surpluses lead to debt imbalances. By definition, a current account deficit 
entails net capital inflows. Germany’s large current account surpluses fuelled 
German banks’ lending to southern Europe. The “consensus narrative” of the causes 
of the crisis tends to neglect the surplus aspect (which could have prompted 
expansionary fantasies or, even worse, criticisms of the export-led model), arguing 
that the crisis was triggered unilaterally by excessive foreign indebtedness on the part 
of peripheral countries: huge capital flows were drawn from the core to the 
periphery, facilitated by the monetary union and its regulatory framework.2  
                                                 
1 They include R. Baldwin, T. Beck, A. Bénassy-Queré, O. Blanchard, G. Corsetti, P. de Grauwe, W. 
den Haan, F. Giavazzi, D. Gros, S. Kalemli-Oczan, S. Micossi, E. Papaioannou, P. Pesenti, C. 
Pissarides, G. Tabellini and B. Weder di Mauro.  
2 Orphanides (2015, p. 11) observes: “The regulatory framework that had been created by the 
governments treated all euro area sovereigns as zero-risk-weight assets, from a capital requirement 
perspective, and exempted them from regulations regarding large exposures”. The author suggests 
that these rules might have induced the financial markets to assume away the country risk.  
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The crisis started — we read in the CEPR document — with a “sudden stop” in 
cross-border lending: the EZ institutions and short-sighted government choices 
combined to trigger a vicious cycle between banks and their governments that 
amplified and spread the crisis. The term ‘sudden stop’ had previously been used in 
the literature to describe a sudden slowdown in private capital flows to emerging 
market economies after the formation of large current account deficits. It was usually 
followed by a sharp fall in demand, production, and employment, and by drastic 
exchange rate depreciation. The assignment of a central role in the EZ crisis to a 
phenomenon observed in emerging markets is interesting because the entire 
institutional architecture of the Monetary Union was based instead on the assumption 
that countries that met the Maastricht criteria for accession were all on a level 
playing field. This concern to stress that “the debt evolution was not a core-periphery 
story” is also found in the CEPR document: in fact, the private and public debt build-
up included France. Even though house prices rose more in the GIIPS than in 
Germany, it is reaffirmed that “there was no simple core versus periphery 
distinction”. Somewhat contradictorily, the statement that “much of the bank lending 
went to the housing sector” is followed by the remark that in the pre-crisis period 
“banks from the ‘core’ (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands) 
bought very large amounts of debt from the nations that would eventually get into 
trouble” (see Table 1, p. 7, showing total lending from core countries’ banks to the 
periphery between 1999 and 2009).  
Now for the second important omission of the ‘consensus narrative’: what 
circumstances led to the ‘sudden stop’? The CEPR document accepts the 
conventional story that the trigger was the newly elected Greek government’s 
revelation that previous governments had masked the size of the budget deficit. 
However, by examining the data on foreign debts held by credit institutions 
published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Lindner (2013) has been 
able to trace the dual role that German and French investors, particularly banks, 
played at the start of the Eurozone crisis. This dual role connects the subprime crisis 
in the US with the Eurozone crisis that hit the European periphery: a concatenation 
of events transforms what had previously appeared to be a local sudden stop 
narrative into a broader, worldwide narrative of contagion. Lindner shows that before 
the Lehman Brothers collapse (September 2008), French and German financial 
institutions held almost a quarter of the debt that the USA owed to foreign banks. 
European banks had accumulated speculative positions buying securitised US 
mortgages through off-balance-sheet Special Purpose Investment Vehicles. These 
lightly regulated ‘shadow banks’ need only a small amount of capital, and as a result 
are highly leveraged. In the middle of 2008, French and German financial institutions 
were also the largest creditors of the countries of the European periphery (not only 
governments but also the private sector): at the time, French and German financial 
institutions accounted for 60% of the amounts owed by Italy, 45% in the case of 
Spain, 42% in the case of Greece, 37% in the case of Ireland, and 33% in the case of 
Portugal3. As a consequence of the US subprime crisis, which began in 2007, 
                                                 
3 Acharya and Steffen (2013) have shown that profits and losses of the EZ core countries’ banks may 
be understood as the outcome of a ‘carry trade’ strategy. With access to short term funding in the 
US wholesale financial markets, European banks have undertaken long peripheral sovereign bond 
positions. “On the upside, the trade would pocket the ‘carry’, the spread between the long term 
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German and French financial institutions suffered large losses. By August 2007, the 
French bank BNP Paribas had suspended two funds involved in the US mortgage 
market. Other French banks were having difficulty securing funds in the interbank 
markets. The German IKB, which had dealt substantially in US mortgage securities, 
also announced in July 2007 that it had been severely affected by the subprime crisis, 
and had to be rescued twice, in 2007 and 2008, through bailouts organized on the 
first occasion by KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, a government-owned 
development bank) and on the second by the German Government itself. 4 In order to 
rebuild their capital, financial institutions called in the loans they had made to what 
we would consider today to be ‘crisis countries’. As Lindner says, “In this way, 
through the banks, the subprime crisis contributed very significantly to the Euro 
crisis”. The expansion of the bank crisis into a Eurozone crisis was helped — 
Lindner adds — by the instructions the European Commission gave in 2009 to all the 
banks that needed to be rescued by their national governments: they were obliged to 
reduce the credit they were providing. Between the second quarter of 2008 and the 
fourth quarter of 2012, the banks covered by the BIS survey reduced the debt held in 
the Euro-crisis countries by 42%, creating massive financing problems. French and 
German financial institutions accounted for half of this cut in lending. These events 
are recalled here to illustrate the context in which the first bailout of Greece took 
place in May 2010. Its failure is crucial because it lies at the origin of a chain of 
crises in Greece and a contagion effect in the other peripheral countries.  
In the CEPR document, the figures documenting the financial exposure of 
‘core’ countries vis-à-vis peripheral countries are followed by some important 
remarks that hint at mismanagement of the crisis. It is worth quoting them in full: 
“This interlinkage between core-nation banks and periphery-nation borrowers 
created one of the fragilities that made the Crisis politically difficult to manage. It 
meant that restructuring the debt of Crisis-stricken nations like Greece would have 
forced the problem back onto banks in nations leading the bailout. In other words, 
the obvious solution of writing down Greek debt might well have increased the risk 
of classic bank-solvency crises in France and Germany. Indeed, this is exactly what 
happened to Cyprus when investors were eventually forced to take a haircut on 
Greek debt” (ibid., p. 7. See also pp. 13-14, where it is maintained that “political 
‘conflicts of interest’” inhibited “some natural solutions such as the writing down of 
Greek government debt in the early days of the Crisis”). The unusually outspoken 
tone of these sentences (and, indeed, the contrast between a ‘natural’ and a ‘political’ 
                                                                                                                                          
peripheral sovereign bonds and banks’ short -term funding costs. On the downside.,… the spreads 
between the two legs of the trade diverged even further resulting in significant losses for banks “ 
and casting doubts on their solvency.(ibid., p.1). For evidence on core EZ banks’ funding in foreign 
financial markets and re-loaning to the European periphery, see Hale and Obstfeld (2014). Shin 
(2011) pointed out that before the subprime crisis European global banks sustained the 'shadow 
banking system' (not subject to regulatory control) in the US by drawing on dollar funding in the 
wholesale markets to lend to US residents through the purchase of securitised claims on US 
borrowers. 
4 According to Mediobanca-R&S (2015, pp. 94-95), in the years 2008-2009 the Landesbanks (banks 
owned by the German Lånder) registered losses amounting to 14 billion euros, writing down more 
than one-third of their net worth. Large losses were due to speculation in financial derivatives.  
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solution of the crisis5) recall the analysis of the first Greek bailout carried out by 
Orphanides (2015), who served as Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus between 
2007 and 2012. He recalls that when Greece sought IMF assistance, one of the 
criteria for an IMF loan was that “a rigorous and systematic analysis indicates that 
there is a high probability that the member’s debt would remain sustainable in the 
medium term”. Since sustainability could not be proved, on the insistence of the 
German and French governments the IMF introduced an exemption to the established 
procedures and proceeded with a programme that by ruling out debt restructuring 
was doomed to failure. ‘Systemic’ reasons, namely the fear of contagion-induced 
losses associated with restructuring, were invoked to justify this exemption, which 
ended up with Greece having to bear additional costs. As Orphanides recalls, the risk 
that a restructuring might ignite contagion in the whole EZ area at the time could not 
be easily dismissed. “The banking system in a number of euro area member states, 
importantly Germany, remained fragile in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis”. As mentioned above, because Chancellor Merkel’s government had bailed 
out several German banks since 2007, new losses would have put the Chancellor in a 
difficult political position.6 This had a decisive influence on the Troika’s decision to 
launch a rescue plan without debt restructuring, even though everyone knew it would 
fail. According to Orphanides, a solution should have been found that would 
compensate Greece for the higher costs associated with the decision to avoid 
restructuring. Instead, fiscal tightening pushed the Greek economy into deep 
recession, triggering a financial panic that soon engulfed the other debtor nations. 
“The result was unfortunate but predictable: massive destruction in some member 
states, and a considerably higher total cost for Europe as a whole.” (Orphanides 
2015, p. 3).  
One merit of the CEPR document is its recognition that, with the exception of 
Greece, the crisis was not led by fiscal profligacy. Spain and Ireland had one of the 
lowest public debt to GDP ratios, and Italy had reduced its public debt by ten 
percentage points of GDP; by contrast, Germany and France had allowed their debt 
ratios to rise above the 60% Maastricht limit (CEPR 2015, p. 5). According to the 
authors’ narrative, the crisis developed in three stages: a) “the capital inflows tended 
to drive up wages and costs, resulting in a loss of competitiveness that validated the 
current account deficits”; b) “much of the investment headed towards non-traded 
sectors like government consumption and housing” (ibid., p. 4); and c) “the rigidity 
of factor and product markets made the process of restoring competitiveness slow 
and painful in terms of lost output” (ibid., p.2).  
As we shall show below, the data on real exchange rates do not confirm the 
idea of a general loss of price competitiveness of the peripheral countries vis-à-vis 
Germany. Further, the idea that investment directed towards tradable sectors makes it 
                                                 
5 See also Orphanides (2014). In his research work, he argued against output-gap-based policy rules, 
favouring non-activist rules drawing on K. Wicksell and M. Friedman. 
6 Orphanides reports a “startling and controversial” statement given by the former Governor of the 
Bundesbank, Karl Otto Pöhl, in an interview published by Der Spiegel on May 18, 2010, just one 
week after the Troika programme had been decided: “It was about protecting German banks, but 
especially the French banks, from debt write-offs” (quoted in Reuters, 2010). On that occasion, he 
argued that Greek debt should have been restructured to reduce it by one-third.  
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easier to repay a country’s debt is implicitly based on the assumption that both traded 
and non-traded products and services had only one final destination, thereby ignoring 
their frequent allocation to intermediate uses. Increasing quotas of services are 
entering the production of exportable goods and/or are becoming tradable. Yet is it 
possible to channel foreign resources into traded goods sectors without some sort of 
investment guidance? Lastly, given the (dubious) universal conviction that ‘structural 
reforms’ consist only in measures targeted to obtain greater labour flexibility, it is 
difficult to maintain that the blame for such a long and deep crisis should be laid on a 
lack of activism in this domain.  
The exclusive focus on the ineffectiveness of monetary policy due to the zero-
bound interest rate has diverted attention from the possibility of a high inelasticity of 
investment with respect to the rate of interest. In early 2015, the ECB at last 
implemented a policy of “quantitative easing”, injecting large amounts of money into 
the economy. One year into this policy, however, we must conclude that, while it has 
been effective in depreciating the euro, thus providing some relief from exports, QE 
has been ineffective in making credit available to firms, stimulating investment and 
expenditure, and kick-starting the EZ economy. To be effective, monetary policy 
should be backed up by fiscal policy, but there is no corresponding party to the 
Central Bank, and no fiscal policy at a EU level responsible for EU-wide aggregate 
demand, while, at the country level, the indebted nations’ fiscal policy is severely 
constrained by the Stability Pact. Thus, the excess liquidity that is created overflows 
into interest rates, the euro exchange rate, and Target2 balances.  
To conclude, the creation of a Monetary Union without a fiscal and political 
union led to ignoring the problems of the transition to full integration and the crucial 
issue of who should eventually pay the cost of this incompleteness. As we argue in 
the following sections, this means that it ignored the problems originating from the 
differing stages of development of its member states. The crisis, which was 
mistakenly interpreted as a standard fiscal/balance of payments problem, actually 
required institutional corrections consistent with these basic flaws.  
3. Alternative interpretations, alternative exit strategies 
The discussion on how to steer the EZ economy out of its present quagmire has 
focused mainly on two alternatives: internal devaluation (wage flexibility) in the 
deficit (Southern European) countries, or expansion of internal demand in ‘core’ 
countries (Germany). In a recent paper written with Gianluigi Nocella (Simonazzi et 
al. 2013), we argued that the former solution is economically unsound, socially 
unfeasible and ultimately counter-productive, while the latter is politically unfeasible 
and probably insufficient. In fact, it is the first that has been put into practice until 
today. 
The disappointing results obtained so far suggest that we should briefly review 
the theoretical and empirical bases of these interpretations. As is often the case in 
disputes among economists, the starting point is a national accounts identity: the 
difference between national savings and investment is identical to the current 
accounts balance (henceforth, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to it as the 
difference between exports and imports: i.e. the trade balance). According to the first 
thesis (which is very close to the CEPR narrative, except perhaps in not 
acknowledging a possible autonomous role for intra-EZ flows), the origin of the 
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Southern European countries’ trade imbalances lies in the excess of investment over 
national savings. Foreign capital bridges the gap, but pushes up wages and prices. 
The lack of price competiveness reveals itself in the excess of imports over exports. 
These persistent deficits find their counterpart in Germany’s persistent surpluses, 
which reflect a ‘virtuous’ propensity to save that finds its expression in German 
competitiveness. This is the so-called ‘culture of stability’: in Southern Europe price 
and wages should adjust downwards, and fiscal consolidation is needed in order to 
obtain internal devaluation. 
The empirical basis for this interpretation is traditionally entrusted to the trend 
of unit labour costs. The question is somewhat more complicated, however. As we 
read in a report by the Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, pp. 41-42)7: “labour cost only 
covers a part of the total costs of industry… this does not take into account the labour 
cost included indirectly in the intermediate products purchased from other domestic 
and from foreign sectors. In other words, the prices of intermediate goods (and the 
labour cost included therein) purchased from other domestic and from foreign 
sectors, capital cost and prices of imported energy and raw materials, taken together, 
have a far greater weight in the manufacturing sector's competitiveness in foreign 
trade than the labour cost incurred directly by industry…..if shifts occur in the 
relative cost structures of the countries involved, such unit labour cost comparisons, 
taken by themselves, permit only limited inferences to be drawn concerning the 
development of total unit costs and hence concerning industry's competitiveness”. 
This has two implications. The first is that given the growing importance assumed by 
the outsourcing of stages of production in the last two decades,8 an analysis of 
competitiveness must compare relative prices and not relative labour costs. The 
second implication is that the weakening of the link between (direct) labour costs and 
prices opens up the possibility to take account of changes in non-price 
competitiveness (based, for instance, on quality upgrading, product diversification, or 
pricing-to-market strategies). A comparison of four real effective exchange rate 
indicators based on Consumer Prices (CPI), Producer Prices (WPI), Unit Labour 
Costs in manufacturing (ULC), and Export Unit Values (XUV) induced Bayoumi et 
al. (2011, p.5) to conclude that this analysis, “for the peripheral countries give[s] 
only partial support to the much-discussed view that external competitiveness 
deteriorated significantly since the adoption of the euro became likely enough that 
interest rates started to narrow”. When comparing the four indicators, Bayoumi et al. 
(2011) were able to find some divergences in the case of Portugal and Spain, but they 
were huge in the case of Italy, where indicators based on ULC and XUV have 
appreciated by about 50 and 110 per cent respectively, while those based on CPI and 
WPI have shown only modest appreciation since 1995.9 A higher real appreciation 
                                                 
7 For a late acknowledgement of the problem, see also Banca d’Italia, Relazione annuale per il 2014 
(2015, p.84).  
8 As we will discuss below, these processes had a major impact on the reorganization of the German 
economic system immediately before and after the start of the Monetary Union. 
9 As far as Italy is concerned, Felettigh et al. (2015) confirmed the findings of Bayoumi et al. These 
authors implemented a new methodology to assess the effective real exchange rates among selected 
member countries. Since the inception of the Monetary Union, France and Germany have gained 
about 6 and 9 percentage points in price competitiveness respectively, against a broad stability 
recorded by Italy and a loss of 11 points recorded by Spain.  
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was systematically found in the extra-euro area, in particular for XUV-based 
indicators, signalling the possible importance of higher quality, niche-type products 
or of pricing-to-market strategies. 
If the standard labour cost indicators do not explain the persistent imbalances 
of peripheral countries, the internal devaluation policy, which is associated with the 
above-mentioned fallacy of composition, cannot be a viable way out of the crisis for 
the countries of the European periphery. One alternative explanation, based on the 
absorption approach, focuses on the implicit link existing between ‘core’ and 
periphery trade balances: if Germany were to succeed in maintaining an excess of 
production over aggregate demand (that is, an excess of national savings over 
investment) thanks to chronically low internal demand, it would have to be obtained 
through an excess of aggregate demand over output in the peripheral countries10. 
Insufficient demand addressed to the peripheral countries condemns them to 
production levels below their potential, and this shows up in an excess of imports, 
which in turn translates into insufficient national savings compared with investment. 
From this perspective, there is no place for moral judgment on the virtuousness of 
savers: in macroeconomic terms, savings are the difference between production and 
(private and public) consumption. As in the Keynesian paradox of thrift, the 
aggregate savings of core and periphery countries alike are largely determined by 
circumstances that are independent of an individual’s choice, while they are affected 
in particular by all policies that induce wage – and thus consumption – restraint. 
Whyte (2010) observed that German competitiveness arises not from greater 
productivity increases but from wage restraint and containment of internal demand: 
“The way in which the savings-investment balance has evolved in recent years 
suggests that the scale of the trade and current account surpluses is as much a 
reflection of the economy’s weakness as of its external strength” (Whyte 2010, pp. 3-
4). The policy implications of this perspective are clear: German internal demand 
(and wages) should go up in order to induce the deficit countries’ export increases 
required to absorb their imbalances. 
While introducing important aspects of the problem, because of its aggregate 
level, this interpretation does not take into account the qualitative composition of 
trade and the possible creation of a mismatch between the quality of productive 
capacity available in the peripheral countries and that of demand. It disregards the 
significant changes undergone by the German economic model from the mid-1990s. 
These changes involved the relocation of important segments of German industry to 
Eastern Europe, a reorientation of exports and imports to the latter and to China 
(which developed strong demand for investment goods), and a strong increase in the 
import content of final demand. These changes occurred in the context of 
compressed domestic demand in Germany. In the case of investments, the internal 
containment that contributed to German excess savings is partly explained by the 
simultaneous increase in foreign direct investment (which is apparently not 
                                                 
10 Gross capital flows are not directly associated with current account unbalances (see Borio and 
Disyatat 2011): in the short run it is possible to have capital exports from a country that exhibits an 
excess of investment over national savings. In the long run, however, current account surpluses can 
only be maintained if associated with net capital exports: otherwise, the currency revaluation will 
sooner or later undermine the surplus. For this reason, we can say that in the long run excess savings 
finance net capital exports.  
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complementary to, but rather a substitute for, domestic investment, see Herzer and 
Schrooten, 2008). As for consumption, low incomes gave rise to growing shares of 
imports of lower price and lower quality consumer goods. The reorientation of 
German trade along international supply chains located in Eastern Europe cut off 
Southern Europe, which had been unable to upgrade its production structure. 
We conclude that it is doubtful whether fiscal expansion in Europe’s core 
economies would suffice to boost sustained growth in the periphery, for two reasons. 
First, an increase in Germany’s public investment would certainly stimulate its 
domestic demand in the short run and also raise its output over the long one. Its 
effects on the GDP of the peripheral countries would depend on a number of factors, 
among which are the stance of monetary policy (Blanchard et al 2014) and the 
import content of demand. However, the regional distribution of the spillovers 
associated with a programme such as this can prove to be quite different, for they are 
in fact much smaller for Southern European countries than they are for other 
European countries. In a recent study, Elekdag and Muir (2014) have estimated that a 
1 per cent increase in government investment would increase German real GDP by 
1.05 per cent, that of other (central) euro-area countries by 0.30 per cent, and that of 
the peripheral countries by 0.20 per cent; and the impact on current accounts is 
similarly differentiated: -0.57, 0.12 and 0.05 per cent respectively.  
More importantly, however, we must consider that these spillover effects will 
reflect the core country’s process of investment and restructuring as determined by 
its choices and priorities, not what is needed to sustain the autonomous development 
of its partner countries. What is good for Germany, for example, is not necessarily 
good for them: that is, an undifferentiated expansion of the core’s internal demand, 
though helpful, will not be adequate to address the deep and growing development 
inequalities in the Eurozone. The peripheral countries need public investment 
targeted on their specific needs, able to envision and encourage the direction of 
change and innovation that best ensures the attainment of autonomous development. 
Only in this way can an increase in the peripheral countries’ income prove 
sustainable in the long run. An independent strategic policy of industrial 
development, however, calls into question the institutional construction of the 
Eurozone, the fiscal compact, and the monetary policy rules. 
Given the institutional constraints, there is little hope that this “third” 
alternative can prevail, at least in the short term. In spite of increasing consensus on 
the perverse effects of austerity policies implemented during a recession (Blanchard 
and Leigh, 2013), “readjustment” policies still rely solely on the “positive” effects of 
internal devaluations — a relative decline in domestic prices and wages, compared to 
the rest of the euro area –– to regain competitiveness.11 We argued that this is not 
                                                 
11 The IMF itself, which was one of the first within the mainstream to warn against the perverse 
effects of implementing austerity policies in recession, has mixed feelings on the matter. A recent 
IMF publication (IMF 2015) concludes that wage moderation in the crisis-hit economies is 
deflationary. However, by reducing long-term interest rates, monetary policy can play a crucial role 
in mitigating the appreciable negative spillovers of this moderation on to other euro area economies: 
that is, a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ wage policy is indeed deflationary, but quantitative easing can 
work to offset its devastating effects (Janssen 2015). As in Blanchard et al. (2014), and in all the 
studies based on the neo-classical synthesis, this conclusion relies on the existence of a relationship 
between interest rates and investment, which has dubious theoretical (and empirical) validity. 
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only a slow and much painful process, but — as far as its primary objective, export 
promotion, is concerned — it is also in vain.  
4. How did we get here? The structural causes of the crisis12 
A longer-term perspective helps us better to assess the limitations embedded in 
the adjustment policies that have been imposed upon the debtor countries of the 
periphery. These policies are short-sighted in two respects: they do not help the 
economies to recover from the crisis in the short-term (the perverse effect of 
synchronized austerity), and, because they ignore the structural causes of the crisis – 
which is rooted in the peculiar problems faced by countries at different stages of 
development – they are inadequate to ensure long-term sustainability. In fact, the 
institutions of the EMU are based on the premise that all its members are on a level 
playing field, except for ‘less modern’ (‘anti-competition’) institutions, individual 
values and attitudes. The implicit assumption is that an austerity regime, associated 
with institutions close to those assumed to be prevailing in ‘core’ countries, would 
create in the periphery the ‘right’ environment for a persistently low cost of capital 
and ‘thus’ for a sustained flow of investment, which would occur automatically, 
especially from external sources (Foreign Direct Investment)13.  
This simplistic assumption, and its related prediction, is proved false by post-
war European economic development experience. An analysis of the main phases of 
the development of European countries since the second post-war period provides 
evidence of wide differences in the productive structures of the countries of the 
centre and the southern periphery of Europe at the start of the Europeanization 
process. These differences entailed an asymmetric capacity of countries at differing 
levels of development to adjust to external shocks. In fact, the process of 
development, which consists in moving upwards towards more complex, less 
ubiquitous, products (Hausmann and Hidalgo 2011), is far from linear. Since it 
occurs through diversification into products that are “near” to those that are already 
being successfully produced and exported, a country’s ability to add new products to 
its production depends on having many near products and many capabilities that are 
being utilized in other, potentially more distant, products. Countries with a low 
diversity of capabilities can become stuck in “quiescence traps”, that make catching 
up more difficult. The existence of discontinuities in the product space and the need 
to develop and coordinate those capabilities demanded by growth industries prove to 
be a formidable obstacle to the process of development. This is why government 
policy is called upon to coordinate the dispersed actions of firms, to help them 
identify new opportunities for differentiation and upgrading, and to contribute to 
developing the capabilities required for the production of more complex products. 
As argued in Berger (2013, p.13), in Germany (but this applies also to regional 
clusters in other countries, for example Italian industrial districts), proximity to 
suppliers with diverse capabilities enables the creation of new businesses not through 
start-ups – which is the US model – but through the transformation of old capabilities 
and their reapplication, repurposing and commercialization. The crisis of the 1970s, 
                                                 
12 This part draws on Simonazzi and Ginzburg (2015). 
13 See, for instance, the European Commission’s last Annual Growth Survey (2015b). 
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which was associated with the saturation of the principal mass consumer goods in 
advanced countries and the start of globalization, led to a profound transformation in 
demand, production, and competition. Demand for substitution and quality 
competition (vertical diversification) favoured the passage from traditional price 
competition to markets dominated by product-led competition. These changes 
marked a profound break in the history of the relations between the centre and the 
periphery of Europe. The ‘centre’ succeeded in strengthening its ability to remain in 
the market thanks to processes of ‘creative destruction’ and reconstruction 
undertaken during the crisis with the support of industrial policies. The restructuring 
of the core deeply affected the countries of the periphery which, in reorganizing their 
economies, struggled to adapt to the new environment (which was dominated by 
deflation and quality competition). Faced with a situation that would have required 
innovation of the State’s capabilities in order to facilitate selective guidance and the 
reorientation of investment to combat a rapidly weakening economic structure, they 
adopted across-the-board liberalization policies instead, implementing what might be 
called a ‘plain destruction’ of their capabilities to create new products, market 
niches, and markets. “Market fundamentalism” … the fallacious proposition that 
markets in general, and financial markets in particular, are capable of regulating 
themselves and therefore do not need public regulation” is “the most important 
policy failures underlying this crisis” (Padoa Schioppa 2011, p. 319-20). The author 
(a former Italian Minister of Economy and Finance and a former member of the 
Executive Board of the ECB) argues that by the end of the 1970s, this “radical idea” 
had conquered “universities, trading rooms, newspaper editorial boards, think tanks, 
central banks, treasury departments and parliamentary committees ... Policy makers 
became not only non-interventionists but also active deregulators”. 
Thus, partly as a consequence of their policies, growth in the peripheral 
countries fell behind in the 1980s, and the crisis associated with deregulation opened 
a gap in aggregate demand that was eventually filled by welfare and construction 
expenditure. This ‘premature deindustrialization’ — restructuring without 
industrialization — exposed the peripheral countries to stunted growth and persistent 
fragility with respect to external changes even before the formation of the Monetary 
Union.  
Later on, the slow growth of the euro area did not sustain the capacity of 
Southern European countries to achieve a sufficient level of diversification and 
specialization of their productive structures; indeed, it may even have contributed to 
worsening it (as seems to be the case with Southern Italy). Conversely, the increasing 
integration of the Central and Eastern European economies into the supply chain of 
German industry speeded up their process of diversification- and specialization. The 
eastward integration of German industry, combined with the persistent containment 
of the internal demand of the major economies of the euro area, has gone hand-in-
hand with an impoverishment of the productive matrix of those southern regions that 
are less connected with Germany and, more generally, with a general redirection of 
trade flows (Simonazzi et al. 2013, p. 664). 
It follows from this analysis that austerity measures do not go to the root of the 
development and debt sustainability problems of Southern European countries, 
which continue to lack a sufficiently broad and differentiated productive structure. 
Given the differences in the levels of development of the various EU countries and 
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their varying capacities to cope with change, fiscal policy should have been assigned 
two complementary targets: a redistributive and compensative function, and the role 
of actively promoting — through investment — the removal of development 
bottlenecks and the renewal of the productive base. In the absence of this guidance, 
the forces protecting and freezing the status quo of institutions and productive 
specialization thus prevailed. “The way was open for a kind of bank-led ‘privatised 
Keynesianism’ (which in some countries took the form of a construction and 
consumption bubble) that concealed — until the outbreak of the global crisis — the 
existence in the European peripheral countries of a demand-and-supply constraint on 
development” (ibid., p. 657). 
5. After the 2007-8 crisis: the limits of export led-growth 
Systemic crises determine major reorganizations of the main driving forces of 
development, specific productive specializations, and the peculiar institutional 
framework that had sought to provide — at least for a given time and space — 
stability to the system. These reorganizations deeply affect ‘core’ and peripheral 
countries and their interrelations. A few years before the formation of the Monetary 
Union, Germany commenced a new phase of reorganization of its economy. For the 
decade and a half following German reunification, its economic performance had 
been poor: between 1999 and 2005, the average growth rate of GDP was 1.15 per 
cent per year, but reorganization of production would lead to growing surpluses and 
to an export boom in the years between 2005 and 2008. While some authors attribute 
this performance exclusively to the effects of the Hartz reforms introduced in 2003 
on wage moderation, Danninger and Joutz (2007) argue convincingly that the main 
determinants of the German export boom can be identified in four circumstances: 1) 
improved cost competitiveness through wage restraint and internal demand 
containment; 2) linkages with high-growth markets in emerging countries (especially 
China and India) through an appropriate mix of products or the use of previously-
established links; 3) an increase in exports of capital goods in response to the 
increased investment in emerging countries; and 4) the formation of a regional 
pattern of supply by relocating part of its production abroad (off-shoring). Although 
these factors are not mutually exclusive, Danninger and Joutz attribute the majority 
of the explanatory contributions to export growth to the second and fourth items. To 
these four points, we would add a fifth: the increase in the incidence of temporary 
and part-time employment and of low- paid workers, especially in the lower-end, 
less-unionized segment of the service sector (which also indirectly contributes to 
exports). The fall in lower incomes explains the sharp increase in income inequality 
and relative poverty in Germany in the last ten years.14 Data on poverty based on a 
socio-economic (SOEP) micro-census15 show a continuously rising trend since the 
turn of millennium, and in 2013, 15.5% of Germans (12.5 million) were classified as 
being affected by poverty. 
These five points establish a general framework that helps to explain — at an 
aggregate, national accounts level — the persistent accumulation of German current 
                                                 
14 See Baldini (2012, p. 25) (elaborations on OECD Earnings Database) and Stadtfeld (2012a, p.1). 
15 See Stadtfeld (2012b). Poverty is defined as a living standard below 60% of the median income.  
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account surpluses since the introduction of the euro. Since 1999, the growth of the 
German economy has been driven not only by the quality of its exports and 
compression of internal demand, but also by imports. The latter consist mainly of 
parts and components linked to the relocation of supply chains abroad, but more 
recently a growing share has been accounted for by imports of consumption goods 
from emerging countries. More stringent income constraints on poorer German 
families explain both the reduction in demand for domestically-produced 
consumption goods and the substitution of consumption goods of intermediate 
quality imported from the European periphery with low price, lower-quality products 
imported from emerging countries, especially China.16  
As mentioned above, an important reason for the rise of current account 
surpluses after 2001 was a sharp fall in domestic private investment as a share of 
GDP, accompanied by an increase in foreign direct investment driven by offshoring 
activities. In the meantime, savings increased due to increased corporate profits, low 
public expenditure and stagnating household disposable incomes. Imports from the 
Eastern European countries – which are characterized by lower labour costs and 
weaker currencies vis-à-vis the euro – sustain the profit rate and the competitiveness 
of German firms, but end up by substituting internal production and imports from 
Southern European countries. By also raising the import content of exports (the so-
called Bazaar Effect), the increase in German imports leads to a growing difference 
between gross export flows and the value added associated with them.  
Since the inception of the Monetary Union, Germany has been able to profit 
from a nominal exchange rate lower than the one which would have prevailed had it 
not belonged to the Euro system, and from an undervalued real effective exchange 
rate due to internal and ‘external’ wage moderation (that is, the cost effect embodied 
in its imports of intermediate and consumption goods from lower-wage countries). 
After 2008, during the years of the EZ crisis, German borrowers received a subsidy 
from Southern European countries through the lower rates of interest due to the 
‘flight to quality’ effect (the other face of the increasing spreads in government 
bonds in the crisis countries). Thanks to this subsidy, during the years of the crisis, 
Germany was able to finance an increase in construction (the only investment to 
some extent responsive to low interest rates), which somewhat mitigated the slow-
down of external demand. 
It is doubtful whether the conditions that favoured the success of German 
exports (and by implication of export-led models in general) will continue into the 
next decade. Contrary to the expectations built on supply-side models, recent 
experience shows that the tendency towards convergence in unit labour costs and 
current accounts, prompted by simultaneous austerity measures across European 
countries, is associated with a pronounced slow-down of the economies in the 
Eurozone, with negative effects on their debt/income ratios as well. Since 2008, the 
deflationary impulses originating from within the Eurozone have been added to the 
impulses from outside, particularly from China. Since Europe’s biggest country is 
reliant on exports and it has been a particular beneficiary of China’s sustained 
investment-led boom, the ‘rebalancing strategy’ carried out by China since 2007 
creates growing uncertainty and concern that goes beyond Germany’s borders. Since 
                                                 
16 See Simonazzi et al. (2013, pp.667-669). 
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the 2007 subprime crisis, the Chinese government has been implementing measures 
targeted on the reduction of various imbalances (and at gaining greater strategic 
autonomy from external influences): the imbalance in domestic expenditure (an 
excessive share of investment relative to consumption), the urban-rural income 
divide, the cost-hinterland divide, asymmetries in access to credit, social security, 
housing, education, and use of emissions.17 This inward reorientation (which is not 
free from the risk of derailment, given the high private debt/income ratio; see Pettis 
2013) has already produced a reduction in the aggregate import/GDP ratio, as well as 
important changes in the composition of imports: a lower share of intermediate 
imports to be processed by foreign firms, and a higher share of luxury consumption 
goods, such as high-quality cars (see Figures 4 and 5). 
 
Figure 4  
Manufacturing imports of China as per cent of GDP by customs regime, 1997-2013 
 
All regimes  ─── 
 
Ordinary         
 
Processing - - - 
 
Other  . . . .  
 
Source: Lemoine et al. (2015). 
                                                 
17 See Mc Kay H., L. Song L., eds, (2012); Lemoine F., Mayo G., Poncet S., Ünal, D., (2014), and 
Lemoine F. , Poncet S., Ünal D., (2015). On the likely effects of China’s rebalancing on the slow-
down of world economic growth, see Pettis (2013).  
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Figure 5  
Structure of Chinese consumer goods imports by unit values segment (2000-2012) 
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Source: Lemoine F. et al. (2015). 
 
This last feature, which helps explain the performance of German exports to 
China even after the subprime crisis, makes them vulnerable to developments in the 
political campaign addressed at reducing ostentatious consumption, and more 
generally to the policy aimed at reducing the greatest inequalities in income 
distribution, eliminating corruption and speculation, etc. (see Lemoine et al., 2015). 
The interdependence of the Chinese economy with the world economy suggests the 
urgency of countering the exogenous deflationary impulses by envisaging an 
international – and in particular a European – strategy targeted at reducing the major 
imbalances within and across European countries. Since the start of the Monetary 
Union, internal and external income inequalities have increased due to the combined 
effect of each European country’s policy of promoting exports at the expense of 
domestic demand and synchronized austerity policies. While a few exporting firms in 
certain regions are able to reap the benefits of these policies, their effects, far from 
trickling down to the economy as a whole, increase the existing divergences and 
create new ones. As the Asian experience has shown, a successful development 
strategy has always been a combination of an import substitution policy geared to 
enlarging the internal market and an export promotion policy.18 Export promotion 
has been used to support import substitution, which, sustained by a set of 
governmental and financial institutions, has been the key focus of the development 
strategy (see Zhu, 2006).  
                                                 
18 See Ginzburg and Simonazzi (2005), pp. 1057-1058. 
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6. The strategic importance of investment guidance for European 
rebalancing 
On 28 March 2012, the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann 
delivered a speech at Chatham House in London titled “Rebalancing Europe” 
(Weidmann, 2012). He stated that Europe needed rebalancing, implying that it 
should address two problems, rebalancing current accounts and consolidating public 
budgets. He asked: Which countries would have to make the adjustment in the 
current account? Further, would the simultaneous correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances and of the public budget trigger a vicious circle of falling demand and 
slower economic growth? On the former issue he bluntly stated: “The typical 
German position could be described as follows: the deficit countries must adjust. 
They must address their structural problems. They must reduce domestic demand. 
They must become more competitive and they must increase their exports” (italics 
added). On the second issue, Weidmann reiterated the traditional view of 
“expansionary austerity”: “consolidation might inspire confidence and actually help 
the economy to grow. In my view, the risks of consolidation are consequently been 
exaggerated”. As mentioned above, three years of synchronized austerity policies 
succeeded in obtaining a re-balancing of the current account in the deficit countries, 
but at the cost of a lower and extremely fragile overall growth. After this failure, an 
investigation on the productive structure of peripheral countries in order to get a 
deeper insight of their ‘structural problems’ is required. We agree that Europe needs 
rebalancing, but we strongly disagree with the idea that the peripheral countries’ 
structural problems may be reduced to a labour rigidity problem: in the era of 
production-led competition, there is a blatant contradiction between reducing 
investment and improving competitiveness. 
Together with a macroeconomic policy targeted to a robust support of 
investments, the policy implications of this approach concern the assignment of a 
strategic importance to investment guidance by the State through industrial policies 
geared to diversifying, innovating and strengthening the economic structures of 
peripheral countries with a long-term perspective. These policies are currently 
implemented ‘under the radar’ – that is, discreetly – in the core countries, but are 
wholly excluded from the list of measures that the European institutions and the IMF 
recommend to peripheral countries in order to satisfy conditionality clauses (for these 
institutions, ‘structural reforms’ are simply another name for ‘deregulation 
measures’). In the mainstream approach, the problem of development consists mostly 
in achieving static efficiency: allocating resources better by countering the market 
failures caused by monopolies, asymmetric information, and externalities.  
More recently, “there has been a revival of the role that industrial policy can 
play. In this context, the issue is no longer the whether of industrial policy, but rather 
the how” (Landesmann 2015, quoting Rodrik 2008). The European Commission, too, 
has finally acknowledged the need for a European policy of public investment, 
though its conception of industrial policy is still confined within the narrow limits of 
acting as a catalyst of private capital without taking a systematic, long-term view. 
The much-publicized Juncker plan19 – using a small amount of public money to 
                                                 
19 Initiated in 2014, the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) – better known as the 
“Juncker Investment Plan” – is too strong on ambition. It “earmarked” almost €315bn to finance 
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leverage private capital, thereby encouraging private investment, growth, and job 
creation – is manifestly inadequate for the aim of kick-starting growth in the 
European Union and helping the peripheral countries towards sustainable long-term 
convergence. Leaving aside the trifling amount of money appropriated and 
uncertainties regarding its actual ability to attract a significant portion of private 
investment, its conception of industrial policy still places faith in the capacity of the 
market to ensure convergence, while reflecting scepticism about the ability of 
governments to manage their economies. This is still very far from a view of 
development as the result of the complex web of links connecting different 
institutions in a dynamic interaction, with the government acting as a long-term 
‘strategic organizer’ rather than as a short-term ‘market optimizer’ (Mazzucato 
2013). The attention paid to linking the inter-related elements of the productive 
structure marks the difference between capability-driven industrial policy and the 
creation of dependency.  
Most importantly, a strategic industrial policy is not simply about developing 
competitive advantages for growth: it is also about characterizing the social needs 
that are consistent with sustainable prosperity. Modern capitalism faces a number of 
great societal challenges, including population ageing, youth unemployment, rising 
inequality, migration flows20, nature protection and climate change. “These 
challenges have created a new agenda for innovation and growth policy that requires 
                                                                                                                                          
European sustainable growth aimed at activating private funds for a total investment volume 
estimated at €1300bn in key sectors such as infrastructure, energy, innovation, education, and 
SMEs. “However, only €21bn from the EU budget and the European Investment Bank will go to 
replenish the EFSI as a financial guarantee”, while it is doubtful whether private funds will produce 
the multiplier effect expected from the confidence boost (Bercault and Yeretzian, 2015). 
20 The U-turn in the German immigration policy, with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s August 2015 
resolution to accept refugee immigrants (soon to be reversed again), may be considered one of the 
few decisions taken by the German government that matches the responsibility of a “big country”. It 
was estimated that the new policy, which also required additional government spending, would have 
had an immediate impact on Germany’s economy similar to a small aggregate demand stimulus 
package. According to one estimate (Deutsche Bundesbank, December 2015, pp. 15-16), GDP was 
expected to increase by ¼, ½ and ¾ of GDP in the years 2015-17 compared with a baseline scenario 
without higher refugee immigration. In a statement issued on 16 September 2015, Bundesbank’s 
president Jens Weidmann preferred to stress the supply side implications of the ‘new’ immigration 
policy, arguing that given the demographic change in Germany, with its rapidly ageing population, 
Europe’s biggest economy “needs additional workers in order to maintain its prosperity”. Some 
estimates have put the lack of qualified workers in Germany by 2020 at 1.8 million. The traditional 
German position, which is strongly opposed to the use of fiscal policy in Germany “in order to 
indirectly stimulate demand in other euro-area countries” has recently been reaffirmed (see 
Deutsche Bundesbank, November 2015, p. 60) with the statement that “it is likely that the scale of 
the fiscal loosening being contemplated would, in any case, have only a comparatively minor 
impact on demand”. As far as aggregate demand coordination is concerned, however, no U-turn in 
Germany’s traditional stance can be found: a few lines earlier, we read: “Looking at the European 
level as a whole, it seems that it would be worth considering a coordinated approach on a 
coordinated basis, at best, if there was a threat of an extensive crisis — such as a self-reinforcing 
deflationary spiral — which even monetary policy can do little to tackle. However, this is currently 
not the case. It does not seem appropriate…to put fiscal policy on a more expansionary course...in 
order to indirectly stimulate demand in other euro-countries, as this would amount to a U-turn on 
Germany’s basic position, which is generally considered sensible”(italics added).  
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policymakers to ‘think big’ about what kind of technologies and socio-economic 
policies can fulfil visionary ambitions to make growth more smart, inclusive and 
sustainable” (Mazzucato 2014). The latter aim involves shaping sector strategies to 
provide for material and social consumption infrastructures. To play this ‘strategic 
role’, states must succeed in attracting the talent, expertise and intelligence needed to 
envision and address contemporary challenges. 
Thus, simply investing in infrastructure is not the goal: it is necessary to align 
production and consumption infrastructures in ways that foster socially rational long-
term growth (Best 2013). Positive complementarities between equity and efficiency 
suggest that ‘investing in people’ and targeting inequality more closely may respond 
to the urgent need to create employment while also favouring innovation and long-
term sustainability. Higher employment is an indispensable prerequisite for the long-
term sustainability of an inclusive system, while an increase in the supply of skilled 
capabilities needs to be matched by an increase in the creation of quality jobs. 
Capacitating public services can yield better long-term results than the neo-liberal 
deregulation of labour markets, which works by lowering labour costs and providing 
incentives for the unemployed to take on poorly-paid jobs. Accommodating critical 
life-course transitions reduces the likelihood that people will be trapped in inactivity 
and welfare dependency. This framework calls into question the whole adjustment 
agenda of the ECB and the EC. Austerity policies, constraining the spending capacity 
of governments, force reductions in social investment, while structural reforms 
interpreted solely as favouring more ‘flexible’ labour markets undermine long-term 
growth.  
7. Concluding remarks 
We have argued that the crisis, mistakenly interpreted as a standard 
fiscal/balance of payments problem, was generated by the incomplete nature of the 
European institutions and a disregard for the consequences of differences in the 
various members’ stages of development. The creation of a Monetary Union without 
a fiscal and political union has meant that both the problems of the transition to full 
integration and the crucial issue of who should eventually pay the costs of this 
incompleteness are ignored. When joining the euro, member states relinquished their 
national management tools without any supra-national governance to take their place. 
The ideological pre-conception that markets are self-equilibrating through price 
competition has been used to justify disastrous internal devaluation policies in the 
belief that an austerity regime associated with institutions close to those assumed to 
prevail in ‘core’ countries would create the ‘right’ environment for resuming growth 
in the periphery. The assumption of an equal level playing field has led to disregard 
of the need for industrial policies geared towards coping with the peculiar problems 
faced by countries at different stages of development.  
A change of strategy is even more important today, since the crisis marks 
another important structural break in world trade similar to those we have described 
for the 1970s and the first decade of the new millennium. In the mid-1970s, 
saturation of the main mass consumer goods markets led to stiff product-led 
competition based on quality and product differentiation. The countries of the 
periphery, which failed to restructure their economic systems to meet this challenge, 
suffered a halt in their industrialization process and lost ground against those ‘core’ 
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countries, which were able to implement the required macroeconomic and structural 
policies. In the first decade of the millennium, Germany once again succeeded in 
reorganizing its economy to meet the demand for investment goods sustained by the 
industrialization of emerging countries. On the cost side, it exploited the benefits of 
wage restraint, industrial outsourcing to Eastern European countries, and the 
‘exorbitant privilege’ of belonging to the Monetary Union and having a dominant 
position within it. The crisis has shown not only an inability to replicate the German 
export-led model across Europe, but also the limitations of this model for Germany 
itself. In fact, the conditions that ensured the success of German exports in the years 
between 2005 and 2007 are no longer present. Since 2007, China has been 
embarking on a path of internal rebalancing that will have major repercussions on 
Europe’s ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ alike because of its quantitative (slowdown in 
growth) and qualitative (changes in the composition of imports due to import 
substitution) effects. It is unfortunate that European leaders still have a tendency to 
tackle the problems they face in the same way as they did in the past, and expect to 
achieve the same outcome, even where the circumstances differ21.  
These premises give rise to a proposal for a radical change in policy: a long-
term plan aimed at activating the interactions between firms and institutions and the 
interdependencies between aggregate demand and the supply of products and 
capabilities. A number of suggestions have been put forward: from a policy of public 
investment financed by euro-bonds, to a strategy of converting a part of the external 
debt obligations of the peripheral countries into a strategic plan for investment (with 
a public-private partnership) (Mazzucato 2013), to the consolidation of national 
government debts (budgetary union). All these proposals stress the benefits that 
would accrue to society from the opportunity to finance much-needed public 
investments virtually for free. A common fiscal authority that issues debt in a 
currency that is under its control – it is argued – would prevent destabilizing capital 
movements within the Eurozone and protect the member states from being forced 
into default by financial markets. This would restore the balance of power in favour 
of the sovereign and against the financial markets (De Grauwe 2015). Finally, by 
promoting the establishment of a sustainable development path, these policies could 
also create the foundation for the repayment of the loans associated with the 
investments. 
There is still very little hope of a radical change of policies along these lines, 
which would require changing the EZ rules. A willingness to move in the direction of 
a budgetary and political union is non-existent in Europe today. This will not only 
continue to make the Eurozone a fragile institution, but justifies Orphanides’ desolate 
conclusion that “In its current form, the euro poses a threat to the European project” 
(2015, p.2). 
                                                 
21 We might recall that after the First World War, Keynes accused the leaders of the time of "attacking 
the problems of the post-war world with unmodified pre-war views and ideas" (Keynes, 2012, p. 
337). 
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